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BOOK REVIEWS
DELAY IN THE COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE REMEDIES FOR DELAYED
JUSTICE. By Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Bernard Buchholz.
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959. Pp. 313. $7.00.
A few years ago the University of Chicago Jury Project was an-
nounced, and shortly became the object of considerable discussion,
partly because of objections to any inquiry that might reveal the true
operation, good or bad, of an institution as encrusted with sacredness
(in public theory as distinguished from private practice) as is the
American jury system, and partly because of objections to an experi-
ment which by its nature required some invasion of the traditional
privacy of specific jury rooms. The present volume is the first pub-
lished product of that Project, though in a sense it is a side product.
As the jury study proceeded, and especially as the relationship be-
tween jury trial and congested court calendars came to be considered,
need for a study of the character and causes of delay in the courts as
an independent topic came increasingly to be recognized. Eventually
such a study was undertaken. This book is a report of its procedures
and findings.
The study as carried out and reported is rigidly statistical. Value
judgments are avoided, except as they are inherent in the statistics
or are so generally accepted as to be substantially beyond argument.
Almost the only example of the latter type of judgment is the basic
assumption that "delay in the courts is unqualifiedly bad." Even that
judgment is limited to cases in which there is "too much" delay,
roughly identifiable as delay beyond the time when the parties and
issues are ready (or in normal course should be ready) for trial.
Exactness and specificity were achieved for the study by basing it
primarily on an analysis of the personal injury trial work of one
particular court. The court used is the Supreme Court of New York
County, New York. That is the court which has general trial juris-
diction for the mass of actions, above a certain monetary minimum,
brought in the island of Manhattan. It is not as badly behind in its
dockets as are some other courts in the nation;' in fact, it is not be-
hind at all in three of its four dockets. It is behind only in its per-
1. The 1959 Calendar Status Study prepared by the Institute of Judicial
Administration of New York University shows the Superior Court of Cook County,
Illinois, to be 52.9 months behind on its calendar, the Circuit Court of the same
County to be 50.3 months behind, and the Supreme Court of Queens County, New
York, to be 44 months behind. Since 1953 the number of courts 25 or more months
behind, in counties of more than 500,000 population, has fluctuated between six
and thirteen.
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sonal injury jury trial docket, which has an average delay of 29.8
months in reaching for trial all the cases on its calendar, and an
average delay of 39.3 months in reaching the run of cases which are
not advanced on the calendar under some sort of preferential treat-
ment. In contrast, the three other dockets, for personal injury non-
jury trials, general (commercial and property cases) jury trials, and
general non-jury trials, are kept substantially current. For reasons
of policy which the study does not evaluate, New York County con-
centrates its calendar congestion in the personal injury jury trial
docket. Furthermore, New York County is different from some other
judicially congested areas in that its backlog of cases is essentially
an inherited one, since cases currently disposed of equal new filings.
It is only the backlog of filings from years gone by that keeps the
court from being current even on its personal injury jury trial docket.
The basic statistic arrived at by the study is 11.7 "judge-years" as
what would be required to dispose of the personal injury jury trial
backlog. A "judge-year" is taken to be the amount of work which one
average trial judge in New York County does in one year. The sta-
tistic means that it would take one additional judge 11.7 years to
bring the docket to currency, or 5.85 judges two years or 11.7 judges
one year to do it. Arriving at this figure was no simple process. The
relevant factors and the variables affecting them are considerably
more numerous and complicated than the ordinary lawyer, however
well acquainted with the general problem, might think. It is evident
that some of the relevant considerations did not become evident to
those who conducted the study until they were well under way with
it, and it is at least possible that more factors will yet come to light
even though the study has been formally completed. There is no claim
of perfection for the study. But the analysis of factors and their rela-
tive weight is convincing, and the final figure cannot be far from cor-
rect. Actually, the important thing is that the same information about
calendar status in another court, analyzed in the same statistical
fashion, would similarly yield for that court a comparable basic sta-
tistic which would measure exactly, or almost exactly, for it the con-
gestion problem it has to deal with.
Since New York County has the equivalent of 25.7 judges assigned
to it at the original jurisdiction level for law and equity cases, with
15.1 of these trying law cases, it at once appears that the docket could
be brought up to date fairly quickly by the designation of additional
judges. The temptation is to take that as the easy and obvious answer
to the problem, one which would involve no tampering with vested
interests in the existent way of doing things. 2 The main object of the
2. Cf. Mullally, Let's End the Hullabaloo: Two Self-Destructive Legal Myths,
45 A.B.A.J. 1039 (1959). The first of the "myths" condemned by the author is
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study, however, is to discover what gains could be made by other
devices that have been suggested for handling judicial business with-
out employing more judges.
One broad area of such suggestions has to do with methods for
shortening the time used in trials. Three major possibilities are taken
up in this area. (1) One chapter reaches the conclusion that approxi-
mately 40 percent of the time used in personal injury jury trials would
be saved if the same cases were all tried by a judge without a jury.
Taking all factors into account, this would clear up the New York
County backlog in between five and seven years, and would then leave
the county with more judge-power than it needs to keep its docket
current without jury trials. But abolition of jury trial is not seriously
regarded as a real possibility for dealing with the problem. (2) In-
creasing the number of jury waivers could work toward the same end.
But New York County already does about all it can do to encourage
waivers, by offering prompt trial if the parties will shift their cases
to the non-jury docket. Thus the fact of delay itself is a major induce-
ment of waivers; if delay were eliminated there probably would be
fewer waivers. This assumes that the parties are correct in their
standard assumptions that delays are somehow advantageous to de-
fendants and that jury trials result in larger verdicts for plaintiffs-
assumptions that are borne out by the statistics. Not much can be
done to encourage more waivers so long as there is a real difference
between jury verdicts and judge awards. (3) The possibility of speed-
ing up jury trials by tighter control of the trial judge over them ap-
pears very real. Comparable trials in New Jersey, where judges do
exercise tighter control, definitely take less time than in New York,
and separate New York statistics bear out this conclusion also.
Another broad group of possible time savers would operate to en-
courage settlements and thus ligthen the ultimate trial load. Four
devices aimed wholly or partially at this end are considered. (1) The
use of a panel of impartial medical experts in personal injury trials
tends to fix the evidential facts beforehand and thus induce settle-
ments. (2) Allowng interest on successful tort plaintiffs' claims from
the date of the accident, as is done in three or four states, does not in-
crease settlements but only raises the amounts paid on settlements.
(3) A pre-trial procedure aimed directly at inducing settlements un-
questionably can and does produce that result, though the saving from
this may be much more in trial-time than in judge-time alone, since
that there is undue calendar congestion in American courts. He argues that much
of the talk about congested court calendars is based on a misuse of statistics, and
that any congestion there may be could be quickly cured by bringing the judiciary
up to proper numerical strength.
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a substantial amount of judge-time may be used up in the pre-trials
themselves. (4) A requirement that both parties file a "certificate of
readiness" for trial showing completion of all regular pre-trial steps,
as a condition to putting their case on the trial calendar, has in the
New York court apparently encouraged compromises in a substantial
number of cases' though more in the commercial than in the personal
injury dockets, and thus has indirectly helped the personal injury
docket by making some additional judge-time available for it. Each
of these four devices obviously has inherent values apart from the
elimination of court delay alone, and one needs in reading the book
to keep this in mind, since the book quite properly restricts its analysis
of them to their effect on delay only.
The next part of the report deals with more effective use of the
present judges' time. (1) The first calculation in this part is as to
the number of days annually on which judges conduct trials. Only
about 196 days in a year are practically available for trials, and some
judges achieve almost the maximum. Others do not. (2) As to hours
of work per court day, generally the same judges who have the worst
rank in lost working days also are at the bottom in hours lost per day.
(3) Concentration of cases among a small number of members of the
trial bar, both on plaintiffs' and defendants' sides, has some delaying
effect, especially if cases postponed because counsel are busy elsewhere
cannot be replaced on the calendar by other cases that are ready for
trial, but there are ways in which judges can control this situation.
(4) In New York County, "leveling the calendar" by removing the
preference given to all except personal injury jury cases and trying
all of the latter docket as the cases are ready for trial would speedily
bring that docket down from its 29.8 months delay to a delay period
of ten or twelve months, but it would move the other calendars from
their present no-delay status up to a ten or twelve months average
delay also. (5) The use of arbitrators, masters or temporary judges
of some kind, until the backlog is eliminated, involves more compli-
cations than advantages.
A section of the report deals with the relation between "claim con-
sciousness" and personal injury filings and trials in various geo-
graphical areas. The conclusion is that there really is such a thing
as greater "claim consciousness" in some communities than in others
and that congested calendars generally are found in "claim conscious"
communities. The correlation is striking, but it is difficult to suggest
anything to do about it.
Finally, in a departure from straight reporting, the book makes an
argument for scientifically controlled official experimentation by
courts and in the judicial system generally as being the only way in
which we can reliably learn much of anything about how the system
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss1/11
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works. This of course is in a sense a defense not only of what is re-
ported in the present volume but of the entire University of Chicago
jury study project. It is an argument that it is better to do a bit of
discreet tampering with judicial processes, with a minimum of inter-
ference or practically no interference with their actual operation,
than it is to remain in ignorance of how they actually operate, and
that this is particularly true when a body of untested legend has
grown up around a portion of the judicial process concerning which
there are vigorous demands for reform. The point is that purported
reforms based on ignorance are as unwise as lethargy based on igno-
rance. The acquisition of reliable information should be a prerequisite
to either action or inaction.
Delay in the Court serves as a model for the acquisition of such
information. It specifically provides the information as to one par-
ticular area, it describes a technique whereby other congested court
systems can be studied in the same manner to the same end, and it
provides inspiration for other studies of equal quality on other aspects
of the judicial process. That is a great deal for one small book to do.
ROBERT A. LEFLARt
THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS. Edited by Clarence Morris,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 571. $9.00.
Two decades ago the teacher of jurisprudence had little choice of
materials for class use unless he was willing to take the heroic step
of gathering his own. Professor Hall's pioneer Readings in Jurispru-
dence (1938) apparently demonstrated a need which could be satisfied
in various ways and induced the casebook press, and jurisprudence
teachers generally, to bring out the same profuse offerings that had
long confronted teachers in more routine fields. Since that time we
have had readings by Cohen and Cohen, Fuller, Simpson and Stone,
Snyder, and Dr. Wu, besides textbooks by Julius Stone and by E. W.
Patterson. With this variety of choices for a course that seldom, I
suppose, enrolls students in great numbers, the publishers must have
incurred losses, and one would think that even tastes as peculiar as
jurisprudence teachers' must have been satiated. And this raises the
question whether there was need for Professor Morris' The Great
Legal Philosophers. In my opinion, little promising as the prospect
may have seemed, there was. This book consists of extracts from
twenty-two of the greatest philosophers and legal philosophers, and
reaches from Aristotle to Roscoe Pound. The arrangement is sub-
stantially chronological, so that after Aristotle each philosopher writes
tProfessor of Law, University of Arkansas Law School.
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